
Willingness or Capability to Protect Lives: Considering the Current Displacement Crisis in Iraq and Syria

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Abstract: *What are the impacts of both Iraq's and Syria's ongoing internal displacement crises on the international community? Can the enormity of the two internally displaced communities be considered as an international security threat? What are the roles of international community towards internally displaced crises? More importantly, what are the alternatives that can be done by the international community, including states, nongovernment organizations and private donors? This paper will focus on the current displacement crisis in Iraq and Syria as well as whether the issue of state's sovereignty applies to such failed states to prevent international community's intervention. It will also offer alternatives toward handling the current conflict of displacement and the need for effective enforcement, not only for the benefit of IDPs, but also to prevent security threats toward other states.*

Keywords: Refugee, Internally Displaced Person, International Community, Right to Intervene, Responsibility to Protect

Research Area: International Law/Middle Eastern Politics/Security Studies

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1. INTRODUCTION

Currently, the rise of terrorism, sectarian conflicts and wars in the Middle East, notably in Syria and in Iraq, have resulted in thousands of people into a forced migrant situation where either they become convention refugees or are internally displaced. According to UNHCR Global Trends Report in 2014, there are at least 2.3 million internally displaced persons (IDP) in Iraq and 6.5 million in Syria.¹ Since 2014, these numbers have increased due to the rise of terrorist activities, involvement of external forces, sectarian conflict and governments' failure to create stability in both Syria and Iraq. However, due to the lack of safety and accessibility, gathering sufficient, valid and reliable data on the exact number of IDPs has been challenging.

The dramatic increase of IDPs and forced migrations in the Middle East can be linked primarily to the rise of terrorism and Jihadist movements.² Although IDP issues have been considered as an international concern, nevertheless, internal displacement is not protected under international law.³ This paper will examine the argument that the international community must recognize that the current crisis of IDPs is not only a concern for human rights, but also a threat to global security. Furthermore, it will also investigate the role of Responsibility to Protect by the international community and whether the international community should intervene in other states' sovereignty to protect IDPs.⁴ The focus of this paper will be on two "failed states", Iraq and Syria, as well as their failure to protect IDPs.⁵

¹ "Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)." *Oxford Public International Law*, 11 Mar. 2016. Web. 24 Feb. 201

² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) - Norwegian Refugee Council. "IDMC » Syria: Internal Displacement in Brief." *IDMC » Syria: Internal Displacement in Brief*. 2013

³ Mooney, Erin. "The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24.3 (2005). Page 9

⁴ The term Responsibility to Protect will be further expanded under VI. Alternative Solutions section.

⁵ The paper refers to failed state as a society that is facing "severe political instability in which the state is unable to provide basic 'political goods' to its citizens such as personal security" (Piazza, 524)],

This failure provides opportunities for extremists' groups to influence them by offering shelter, manipulate and recruit these vulnerable groups for military and political purposes. The militarization of these groups not only expands extremists' influence in the state, but also spreads their control and violence beyond borders, leading to destabilization across the region and the creation of international security threats.

First, the paper will look at the differences between the IDP and refugee classes and analyze their legal definitions under international law. In addition, it will identify what leads to the rise of these two classes of forced migrants -IDP and the refugees- as well as the challenges each have to face, and then apply this analysis to the cases of the failed states of Iraq and Syria. The importance of demonstrating the dilemmas that IDPs face is to recognize their vulnerabilities, which can be taken advantage of by terrorist organizations. This section is important to argue how the rise of IDPs is an international security threat and humanitarian crisis, but also to suggest alternatives to prevent the rise of IDP crises. The last section of this paper will explore the purpose of international community and its limitations regarding the issue of state's sovereignty.

2. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES (DEFINITIONAL ISSUES)

Issues of internally displaced persons and refugees are increasing across the globe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2015, forced migration (IDP and refugees) has reached its highest number since WW2.⁶ As a result of terrorist activities and civil wars in the region, many of the refugees and IDPs are from the Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria. According to the 2015 Global Peace Index, forty-three percent of the Syrian population has been displaced to escape hostilities and the number has increased since then.⁷

There are different views considering who is a refugee or IDP. For example, Global statistics counts IDPs, as is the Convention definition of refugees, as those who are displaced only as a result of violence and conflict.⁸ Others have broadened the term to define all who face "natural disasters and development projects".⁹ In some cases, IDPs are also referred to as "internal refugees", which means people who are forced to seek refuge in other parts of their own country.¹⁰ This research will focus on the definition provided by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, in which IDP is described as:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognized State border.¹¹

Although the definition of IDP is broad by including different causes of displacement, but the commonality among IDPs is "involuntary movement and being within one's border".¹² The

⁶ Graham, A. David, "Violence Has Forced 60 Million People From Their Homes," *The Atlantic* 2015.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Mooney, Page 9

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid, Page 9, 13

¹¹ "Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)." *Oxford Public International Law*. N.p., 11 Mar. 2016. Web. 24 Feb. 201

¹² Mooney, Page 14

fact that the IDP definition includes all kinds of conflicts can be problematic, since it does not place the focus on a specific issue or assistance that is needed to protect these people.¹³

In regards to refugees, under the 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugee, Article 1, A (2), a refugee is defined as follows:

a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.¹⁴

Comparing the two definitions, both refugees and IDPs experience similar challenges, such as facing fear and human rights violations in their home countries. However, the term refugee defined under the UN Refugee Convention does not acknowledge any natural or human made disasters. One certain factor that both refugees and IDPs have in common is that in both cases, they are forced to abandon their homes because they have no other options to survive.¹⁵

Unlike refugees, there are no legal instruments that specifically protect the rights of IDPs. The United Nation's definition has a “descriptive role”, which provides an international recognition of IDPs, rather than guaranteeing certain rights exclusive to them under International law.¹⁶ However, for a person to be recognized as a refugee, they need to go through specific processes, which determine their status. IDPs do not need to go through any processes to receive their title, as long as they are displaced and located within their borders.

As Walter Kalin¹⁷ argues, refugee legal status, which guarantees rights, is a required process since refugees are no longer protected by their own states, unlike IDPs who are already members of a particular country.¹⁸ However, the issue arises when a state is unwilling or incapable of protecting their own IDPs. In this case, there can be two solutions. First, if the state is unable to protect their IDPs, they have the right to request for assistance from the international community.¹⁹ Second, if the state is unwilling to protect certain IDPs within their jurisdiction, then it becomes a concern to the international community, which will be expanded upon later in this paper.²⁰ If the demands of IDPs are being protected by their own states, then there is no need for the international community to intervene, although the recognized government of that state may well request assistance.²¹ But the issue of “willingness” and

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, n.d. Web. 24 Feb. 2017

¹⁵ Moore, Will H., and Stephen M. Shellman. "Refugee or Internally Displaced Person? To Where Should One Flee?" *Comparative Political Studies* 39.5 (2006), Page 599

¹⁶ "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, n.d. Web. 24 Feb. 2017

¹⁷ An International human right lawyer who was appointed as Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally Persons in 2004

¹⁸ Mooney, Page 14

¹⁹ "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Responsibility to Protect Report." *Council on Foreign Relations* (December 2001). Page VIII

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

“capability” is highly dependent on the various internal and international factors, and the political preference of the state, which will be further expanded in the paper.²²

3. IDP AS A SECURITY THREAT

Despite different circumstances (natural or human made disasters, armed conflicts and human rights violations) that cause displacement, they all create a high level of vulnerability. As a result of forced migration within the country, people lose their homes, most of their possessions, friends, community, and as in most cases their families too.²³ Suddenly, their overall idea of traditional way of living changes into a worsen condition of survival, seeking shelter, food and medication. Their experience of facing these massive losses has many side effects such as facing “impoverishment, social isolation, exclusion from health, welfare and education provision, the breakdown of social relationships and support structure, and the undermining of authority structure and social roles”.²⁴

Facing these conflicts, IDPs in failed states pose a high security threat since terrorist groups’ safe havens are usually located in failed or failing states.²⁵ According to different qualitative case studies, failed states and terrorism are usually linked together for two reasons.²⁶ First, due to high political instability in a failed state and the government’s inability to provide basic needs, security and education, it opens the opportunity toward creation of terrorist groups out of those who are facing constant violence.²⁷

Secondly, influential political elites involved in fail states tend to highly support terrorist groups financially, as well as allowing them to openly operate their activities in bigger and more influential territories within the country.²⁸ In return, they receive “material compensation and political support of terrorist services during times of political turmoil” against the failed government.²⁹

i. Iraq

Due to external military interventions, rise of sectarian violence and the civil war since 2003, Iraq has experienced both massive internal displacements as well as significant numbers of refugees leaving the country, something both Iraq and neighboring countries feared it as a threat.³⁰ As a result of sectarian politics, militant groups in Iraq implemented ethnic cleansing as a dominant tool to expand their power within the country.³¹ Currently, there are more than

²² Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006. Print.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Hagel, Chuck. 2004. A Republican foreign policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 83(4): 64–76. [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]. Page 65

²⁶ Supported by various authors, including Rotberg, Robert I. 2002. The new nature of nation-state failure. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 85–96. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [CSA], [Google Scholar] Kahler, Miles. 2002. “Networks and failed states: September 11 and the long twentieth century. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association”. Boston

Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas. 2002. *Do terrorist networks need a home?* *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 97–108. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [CSA], [Google Scholar]

Piazza, James A. "Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30.6 (2007): 521-539. Page 527

²⁷ Piazza, James Page 524

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Lischer, Page 95

³¹ Ibid.

three million IDPs live in Iraq.³² Humanitarian workers have been providing reports on the recruitment of significant numbers of displaced Iraqis by militant groups because of their vulnerabilities and sometimes they are forced to join them for the safety of their families.³³ As Kristele Younes argues, under the difficult circumstances that IDPs face, their “loyalties can be bought” by offering shelter and protection.³⁴ At the same time, children are mostly affected as a result of displacement, since instead of getting the right education and normal way of living, they face fear and hardship.³⁵ Regarding the issue of displaced children, Tom Porteous³⁶ claims that, “Unless this crisis is addressed, we may well look back in 10 years’ time and see the seeds of the next generation of terrorists”.³⁷ Therefore, not only IDP vulnerabilities can be used for recruitments by extremist groups, but especially their children faced with the difficulties of trying to adapt to such unstable and dangerous circumstances can be targeted by extremist groups.

When an unstable state constantly faces violence, the possibilities of people being radicalized also increases, especially in the case of Iraq, where tribal conflicts and sectarian crisis contributes to hostilities and violence throughout the state. Also, due to tribal conflicts, it becomes harder for IDPs to travel to a safer area, since local tribes mostly reject accepting outsiders into their community, especially in southern Iraq. Similarly, in the northern part of Iraq, they do not allow new people in, therefore most IDPs only solution is to relocate outside of towns and live in tents.³⁸

This shows that even if IDPs do not join military groups, the tension still increases throughout the country due to tribal conflicts, sectarian violence, lack of a dominant power to organize these different groups, and in the case of Iraq, ISIS trying to take control of important territories, such as Mosul and Baghdad.³⁹ As the number of IDPs rises in Iraq, it further proves the failure of Iraqi government and the U.S to maintain stability in the country.⁴⁰ It is important to recognize that Al-Qaeda was formed by Sunni militias as an extremist resistance group toward US-led invasion in the region and became the major source of sectarian conflicts in Iraq.⁴¹ Although many of them joined the militant group in Syria against President Assad, the rest took advantage of the U.S military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the increase of Sunni violence in response to the corruptions by Iraqi’s Shia-led government continued to weaken the country.⁴²

Since the ISIS continues to fight to take over Northern and Western part of Iraq and on the other hand, the Iraqi government, as well as the U.S, Russia and other external forces keep bombarding those areas to recapture cities, it will likely lead to more displacements.⁴³

³² "Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission." *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*. European Commission, 07 Aug. 2014. Web. 02 Mar. 2017

³³ Lischer, Page 95

³⁴ Kristèle Younès, Refugees International, interview by author, Washington, D.C., September 25, 2007. Kristele Younes is a humanitarian advocate at Refugee International.

³⁵ Mooney Page 15

³⁶ Tom Porteous is the director of Human Rights Watch

³⁷ Gidley, Ruth. "Where Will Iraq, Its Refugees Go Next?" *Middle East Online*, 26 June 2007.

³⁸ The paragraph is supported by Gidley, Ruth. "Where Will Iraq, Its Refugees Go Next?" *Middle East Online*. N.p., 26 June 2007. Web. 27 Feb. 2017

³⁹ "Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps." *BBC NEWS*. BBC, 20 January 2017

⁴⁰ Lischer, Page 96

⁴¹ "Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps"

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "The Current Situation in Iraq." *United States Institute of Peace: Making Peace Possible*. 20 March 2017

According to the latest report by Doctors without Borders, due to the massive military offensive to recapture Mosul from October 2016 to present, thousands of people are suffering in the crossfire and there is a high demand for medical assistance, food and clean water.⁴⁴ They have stated that the situation will get worse, since all the routes to receive supplies have been under siege and 28,000 IDPs located in the south of Mosul are facing severe malnutrition.⁴⁵ They reported that this severe situation also applies to other camps in Iraq as a result of massive fleeing from Mosul to other parts of the country and the existing aids and services are not helpful enough to stabilize the current crisis.⁴⁶

On the other hand, since ISIS's major funding comes from seizing oil fields and the U.S and Russia are attacking oil infrastructure, ISIS will need more recruits to expand its control against external attacks.⁴⁷ Besides the Iraqi government's forces against ISIS, there are also various reports about human rights violations by these Iraqi security forces, as well as Shia militias against civilians (especially Sunni-Arabs and religious minorities), further exacerbating the situation faced by IDPs in Iraq.⁴⁸

ii. Syria

Currently, Syria has produced the largest number of refugees and IDPs.⁴⁹ Around 6.6 million IDPs live in Syria, struggling to survive every day.⁵⁰ A majority of the population has been displaced due to the rise of hostilities in the country, especially at the end of 2013.⁵¹ In 2012, Al-Qaeda in Iraq set up a militant organization, Al-Nusrah Front in Syria under the leadership of Al-Julani.⁵² In 2013, the joined forces of Al-Baghdadi and Al-Julani led to the creation of "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL).⁵³ Although both leaders had similar extremist ideologies, Al-Julani was against Al-Qaeda's leader becoming the Islamic "caliphate", which increased the tensions between both Al-Qaida and Al-Nusrah Front in Syria, which further led to mass displacement crisis in the region.⁵⁴ In addition, the involvement of the Iranian backed Shia militia-Hezbollah based in Lebanon- supporting Assad's government and fighting against Sunni radical militias has resulted in more displaced civilians and the spreading of sectarian violence across the region, especially against Christians, Shiites, Druze and Yazidis.⁵⁵

In 2014, half of the Syrian population fled from their homes, third of the population still remained in Syria, and the rest travelled to neighboring countries.⁵⁶ In 2015, just from

⁴⁴ Doctors Without Borders is an international humanitarian organization, dependent on private donations. "Iraq: thousands Fleeing Western Mosul with Acute Medical Needs." *MSF USA*. Mediciens Sans Frontieres- Doctors Without Borders. 22 March 2017

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "The Current Situation in Iraq"

⁴⁸ "Iraq: Populations at Risk- Current Crisis" Report From Global Centre for the Responsibility o Protect, *ReliefWeb*. 6 February 2017

⁴⁹ "Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons- European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations- European Commission"

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "IDMC » Syria: Internal Displacement in Brief."

⁵² Beyani, Chaloka. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on His Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic." *United Nations General Assembly*. United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015. Web.

⁵³ ISIL is also known as ISIS, which this paper previously refers to it. Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Valley, Paul. "The Vicious Schism between Sunni and Shia Has Been Poisoning Islam for 1,400 Years - and It's Getting Worse." *The Independent*. Independent Digital News and Media, 19 Feb. 2014. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

⁵⁶ Beyani, Chaloka

March to May, 300,000 people left their homes in Idlib when the city fell under the control of non-state armed militias.⁵⁷ According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there are many restrictions for IDPs to cross Syria's borders, which breach the 1951 Geneva Convention and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.⁵⁸ There are 525,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, and most of them have not been allowed to enter neighboring countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, because they have their own long-term resident Palestinian population.⁵⁹ With the involvement of the various countries and militias in Syria's civil war, many different parties are accountable for violating human rights, including airstrikes by the Syrian government itself on displacement camps located in the north of Syria, further complicating the situation.⁶⁰ Attacking IDP camps shows the Syrian government's unwillingness to protect its internally displaced people. Chaloka Beyani⁶¹ identifies attacking displacement camps as a "crime against humanity and/or a war crime", which was recognized by the international community but no effective actions have been taken to control Assad's abusive actions toward Syrian people.⁶²

Another significant challenge that exists in Syria is the lack of security for humanitarian organizations. Many of humanitarian workers have been killed or kidnapped by radical groups while their ability to deliver humanitarian aid and assistance has been actively prevented.⁶³ There has been lack of accessibility for humanitarian workers to enter specific areas to provide assistance.⁶⁴ Also, the safety of aid workers is only guaranteed in certain locations, mostly in areas that are not besieged by non-state actors.⁶⁵ As a result, in 2014 the UN adopted UNSCR 2165 to provide cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan, including providing medical assistance, food, nutrition, education and shelter.⁶⁶ However, even with these efforts there remain around 3.9 million IDPs who are located in out of reach areas and in need of assistance.⁶⁷ Most of them are located in the four Syrian towns of Al-Zabadani, Al-Fu'tah, Kafraya and Madaya.⁶⁸ Since November 2016, humanitarian access to these four towns has been denied and civilians are required to receive permission of parties in power to leave the besieged towns.⁶⁹ On February, 2017, a senior United Nations Relief official called for negotiations among all parties to allow immediate humanitarian care to civilians trapped in those four cities.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, assistance can be provided only if the parties in negotiations

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) - Norwegian Refugee Council. "IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State." *IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ UN Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs

⁶² "IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State."

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ "About the Crisis." *OCHA*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2017.

⁶⁵ Beyani, Chaloka. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on His Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic." *United Nations General Assembly*. United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015. Web.

⁶⁶ "About the Crisis."

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ "Civilians in Syria's 'Four Towns' Need Support as Humanitarian Catastrophe Looms – UN Relief Official." *UN News Center*. United Nations, 13 Feb. 2017. Web. 12 Mar. 2017.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

come to a conclusion and until then, civilians continue to “suffer a cycle of daily violence and deprivation”.⁷¹

Beside security issues for humanitarian workers, there is also a massive shortage of international donations towards humanitarian agencies.⁷² This considerable shortfall of funding means that there are significant limitations on providing assistance by aid workers.⁷³ This further affects any ability to overcome the continuous blockage of humanitarian aids (food, water, medical assistance) by the Syrian government and various militant opposition groups so that they are able to use civilian suffering as a war tactic.⁷⁴ There also has been massive destruction of infrastructures and housing, not only caused by direct violent conflict, but also destroyed by the Syrian government’s use of its military for the purpose of “collective punishment”.⁷⁵ In 2014, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre stated that:

The Syrian Authorities have not only failed to protect civilians from or during displacement, but their deliberate targeting of noncombatants has also been the main cause for their massive displacement. Sieges, checkpoints and international border restrictions have prevented civilians in need of protection from fleeing to safer areas, either within or outside the country. For their part, several fundamentalist Islamist groups have also forced civilians to flee and carried out human right violations that have led to their displacement.⁷⁶

Syrian government forces and militant opposition groups have implemented checkpoints that targets IDPs from crossing borders, even moving town-to-town, which makes them trapped in unsafe areas, such as Homs, Muadhmiya, Yarmouk, Nubu and Zahra facing dramatic needs for humanitarian aids.⁷⁷ The largest Palestinian refugee movement of, around 148,000 after the creation of Israel in 1948 ended up at Yarmouk in Damascus.⁷⁸ According to 2014 report, there have been more than twenty thousand Palestinians trapped in Yarmouk facing extreme pressures, because of the sieges by the Syrian government and many of them have starved to death.⁷⁹

It has been argued that due to the absence of any political solution for Syria, hostilities and violence will likely to spread in 2017 and the suffering that Syrian civilians are facing needs to be handled by international forces.⁸⁰ Although different external forces and international organizations are already involved in Syria, it is significant to look at what could be more done by the international forces to decrease the tensions or whether their involvement is necessary? If they intervene in the current crisis, what is the likelihood of a positive versus a negative impact? If the latter, then would this lead to further instability and lessen the chances to address the plight of the IDPs? And how might this affect contiguous state and the political security and overall stability of the people and the states in the region?

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Beyani, Chaloka

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ "Syria: Thousands of Houses Unlawfully Razed." *Human Rights Watch*. N.p., 23 June 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

⁷⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) - Norwegian Refugee Council. "IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State." *IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014. Web. 14 Mar. 2017

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ "The Crisis in Yarmouk Camp." *UNRWA*. N.p., 17 Apr. 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

⁸⁰ "About the Crisis"

4. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Iraq and Syria are now considered as failed states and there is no evident solution to put an end to IDPs except by creating political and social stability in each country. However, there may be pragmatic solutions which can decrease the humanitarian crisis, the militarization of IDPs, and their threat to both local and global security. Legally, responsibilities for IDPs falls under their own government and in a case where the state fails to protect IDPs, under the norms of international humanitarian laws as well as the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it becomes a concern to the international community.⁸¹

The term R2P was first developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.⁸² As an attempt of the UN to reform its human rights policies and provide a universal protection for all people, R2P was again recognized at the UN 2005 World Summit among states and international organizations.⁸³ As a result, the heads of states and organizations agreed upon the sovereignty and responsibility of each state to protect its citizens, prevent hate crimes and in times of crises the international community is responsible to provide diplomacy and humanitarian assistance for the protection of targeted people.⁸⁴ They have also agreed that if a state fails to protect, plus the peaceful assistance of the international community is not enough to protect people, the last measure is the “collective use of force” with the authorization of the UN Security Council.⁸⁵ The R2P report was officially implemented in 2009 and the resolution is a case-by-case guideline, dependent on the approval of the members of the UN Council.⁸⁶ Undermining a state’s sovereignty for the protection of IDPs and the need for the approval of the members of the UN Council has been the topic of debates, questioning the efficiency of the international community for the protection of IDPs.⁸⁷

It is important to note that the struggles in Iraq and Syria are different in terms of the intensity of the violence each country has to face, as well as the role of the government and the external forces involved within the country. Similarly, both countries are currently dealing with sectarian conflicts and terrorist activities, which creates massive population displacement.

However, the question is whether the international community should protect IDPs in Syria and Iraq? What kind of interventions by the international community is justified in both sovereign states of Iraq and Syria for the protection of IDPs? How should they enforce it and overcome the issue of sovereignty and why should other states and donors offer assistance? This section will look into whether, and if so, why other states and donors should support IDPs through humanitarian aid, financial aid, and the responsibilities of international community to handle IDP crises. Since there is a relation between IDPs and refugees (many IDPs eventually

⁸¹ Abarbanell, Stephan. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE. S.I.: HARPERCOLLINS, 2017. *UNHCR- The UN Refugee Agency*. Web.

⁸² The term ICISS will be more explained in Section v. *Right to Intervene Versus Responsibility to Protect*. "Learn About RtoP." IRCtoP. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, C/o World Federalist Movement- Institute for Global Policy, n.d. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ "Burma Resolution in Security Council Vetoed by Russia and China; Implications for R2P." IRCtoP. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, C/o World Federalist Movement- Institute for Global Policy, n.d. Web. 13 Apr. 2017.

⁸⁷ The debates will be analyzed later in *i. Need for Effective Enforcement* and *ii. Right to Intervene Versus Responsibility to Protect*

forced to seek refuge in other countries), the next section will also touch upon the Syrian and Iraqi refugees.

i. Humanitarian Assistance

IDPs basic needs are to have proper food, shelter, healthcare and education of which the aid provided to them by international humanitarian organizations can be a short-term solution.⁸⁸ The UNHCR mandate mainly covers refugees, but in 2005, it was given the leading role to protect IDPs, as well as providing shelter and managing their camps.⁸⁹ UNHCR is an organization that is highly dependent on donors funding support, such as governments, the private sectors, and other institutions.⁹⁰ But since IDPs are the result of internal conflicts within one state, sometimes donors do not provide support or assistance so that they do not intervene in another state's internal conflict.⁹¹ In the case of Iraq and Syria, the risks of IDPs joining militant groups and their expansion will not only affect the region, but also the international community. Therefore, more involvement of international donors in providing humanitarian aids will likely have significant effect on lessening IDPs vulnerability to join military groups. Unfortunately, according to the UNHCR financial budget, the gap between funding and the needs of people is increasing.⁹² The majority donor supports comes from governments and the largest emergency assistance by UNHCR is provided toward Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey, which is 23% of the budget.⁹³ UNHCR needs to implement a more effective plan to raise funds and attract private donor, corporations and new governments to invest.

ii. Direct Link Between IDPs and Refugees

Many individuals who are forced to leave their homes and relocate to another part of their country eventually tend to seek refuge in another country to gain the protection of the foreign country and the international community.⁹⁴ This statement also applies to Iraq and Syria which, as a result of the rise of IDP crises in both countries, and the lack of the international community's support, there is a high chance of IDPs to seek refuge in neighboring countries and create economic and political tensions in receiving countries as well. According to UNHCR report in 2007, due to internal conflicts in Iraq, around 40,000 to 50,000 IDPs a month migrated from Iraq to Syria and Jordan. Moreover, although both countries had overreached their limit of accepting refugees and providing assistance, no international community intervened to help with the cost, which escalated more tensions in Syria and Jordan. The existence of internal conflicts within Syria, as well as reaching its limits of refugee acceptance, the country had to face increases in prices, of unemployment and in water consumption, which led to a "security time bomb" to start ticking in Syria since 2007.⁹⁵

Currently, Syrian refugees moving to Jordan pose a security threat to the country, due to the high number of Palestinian-Syrian refugees adding to the already existing Palestinian

⁸⁸ Lischer, Page 97

⁸⁹ Abarbanell, Stephan. *INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE*. S.I.: HARPERCOLLINS, 2017. *UNHCR- The UN Refugee Agency*. Web.

⁹⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Donors." *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

⁹¹ Abarbanell, Stephan.

⁹² "Needs and Funding Requirements." Reporting.unhcr (n.d.): n. pag. UNHCR Global Appeal 2017 Update. 2017. Web. Page 18

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ "Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons." HREA. The Global Human Rights Education and Training Centre, n.d. Web. 14 Apr. 2017.

⁹⁵ This paragraph is based on the statics given by : Gidley, Ruth. "Where Will Iraq, Its Refugees Go Next?" *Middle East Online*. N.p., 26 June 2007. Web. 27 Feb. 2017

people in Jordan.⁹⁶ Right now, there is still a lack of funding provided to host states such as Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan to protect Syrian refugees. To further examine, low international funding leads to three problems.

First, refugees will no longer have access to enough food, water and medical assistance in the receiving country. Second, they will be seen as a burden in the receiving country, which worsen their living condition. More importantly, lack of accessibility to basic needs will create tensions concerning finding jobs and paying rents. Currently, the Lebanese government fears that the country's security is being compromised as a result of the high competition among refugees as well as the influence of extremist groups who are taking advantage of the situation by providing support for vulnerable families.⁹⁷

iii. States' Cooperation

For IDPs, who are forced to leave their homes and struggle to survive, they are usually dependent on the humanitarian assistance provided by the international community.⁹⁸ It is important to note that other states financial intervention toward providing humanitarian aids can prevent IDPs forced migration beyond their borders and undermine the host country's security and economic. Donating funds and assistance by governments can lessen IDPs' vulnerabilities in their countries, which they no longer need to seek refuge to receive basic needs and the protection of another country. One example is the role of Turkey as the largest refugee hosting country, which receives funds from the European Commission to protect and keep these refugees from crossing borders.⁹⁹ But at the same time, the high number of refugees that Turkey accepts is also problematic, from poor living conditions to constant discrimination.¹⁰⁰ Also, since the July 15th, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey there have been changes in security policies, NGOs and UN refugee agencies have reported Turkey's breach of the Geneva Convention concerning the deportation of Syrians from Turkey.¹⁰¹ Greece also refused to send refugees to Turkey, claiming that it is an unstable country.¹⁰²

On the other hand, President Erdogan states that Europe is not following its promises to financially support Syrian refugees located in Turkey.¹⁰³ At the same time, due to the rise of anti-immigrant policies and fears toward Muslims in Europe is growing public support for Europe to abandon its deal with Turkey.¹⁰⁴ If the Turkey-EU deal collapses, IDPs trying to escape Syria will continue crossing the Aegean to reach Europe. As with earlier wave of people seeking asylums, many will drown in the Aegean and smugglers will take advantage of the rest. On the other hand, as a result of the Turkey-EU deal, many refugees are stuck in Aegean Island in Greece, since the EU has closed its borders.¹⁰⁵ According to 2016 report of the Amnesty International, more than half of G20 countries are not following their fair share of

⁹⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) - Norwegian Refugee Council. "IDMC » Syria: Internal Displacement in Brief." *IDMC » Syria: Internal Displacement in Brief*. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2017.

⁹⁷ This paragraph is based on: "Situation Update Jan-March 2015." *Syria Crisis Response* (2015): n. pag. Web.

⁹⁸ "Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission." *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*. European Commission, 07 Aug. 2014. Web. 02 Mar. 2017

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Dinc, Pinar, and Irem Aydemir. "The EU-Turkey Deal: Ambiguities and Future Scenarios." *Euro Crisis in the Press*. The London School of Economics and Political Science, 27 Oct. 2016. Web. 02 Mar. 2017.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Weaver, Matthew. "Syrian Refugees: More than 5m in Neighbouring Countries Now, Says UN." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 30 Mar. 2017. Web. 17 Apr. 2017.

accepting refugees in this time of crisis and many of them are “blocking global plans to share responsibility for the world’s refugees”.¹⁰⁶ The European Union, Russia and China mostly focus on their national interest, which emphasize how little G20 (except Canada and Germany) have done so far to reach a global solution to the refugee crisis.

iv. State’s Internal Support

Even were the failed state is willing to protect IDPs by providing camps and shelters outside of town, this likely would further their impoverishment and make them targets of attacks or recruitment by military groups opposed to the government.¹⁰⁷ An alternative solution that can be done by the state is to create housing and shelters within cities, rather than excluding IDPs from urban areas. A problematic part is that since both Iraq and Syria are facing sectarian conflicts and those who are in charge only favors certain groups of people, governments are unwilling to protect all IDPs by providing housing within cities. However, the Iraqi government, under international community’s pressure, has recently shown efforts to protect IDPs from being recruited by terrorist organizations, unlike Syria, which the government has claimed many of IDPs as the “enemies of the state” and constantly are being attacked by Syrian government forces.¹⁰⁸

v. Need for Effective Enforcement

According to the 2015 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR) report on Iraq, the Committee announced various violations under international law by ISIS including killing, torture, rape, abduction and recruitments of children for military purposes.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, the Committee recognizes the human rights violations of Iraqi Shia Security Forces against civilians, including torture, killing and indiscriminate attacks.¹¹⁰ The alternative suggested by the Committee is that the Iraqi government should promptly investigate human right violations and provide protection for vulnerable groups (due to their ethnicity, religion).¹¹¹ Further, that women and children who have been recruited under ISIS need to be provided with physical and psychological aids.¹¹² Though it is essential that the Committee recognizes the issue of IDPs in Iraq and is concerned about their freedom of movement, but the alternative they provide is for the Iraqi government to strength its protection for vulnerable people. However, under the Committee’s pressure and the U.S military and political involvement in Iraq to defeat ISIS, Iraqi government itself has shown willingness to follow the international human right treaty adapted by the UN, given that the government itself have been previously violating the basic human rights of Iraqi civilians, especially IDPs. But, the issue stills remains that a failed state is not fully capable of providing effective law-enforcement to either protect its citizens or to contain terrorist activities, without military and humanitarian involvement of external forces.¹¹³ Although the ICCPR identifies security issues, such as violent attacks, discrimination and lack of protection toward IDPs, refugees and especially Palestinian refugees

¹⁰⁶ "G20 "burden-sharing" Call on Refugee Crisis Hypocritical." G20 Burden Sharing Call on Refugee Crisis Hypocritical. N.p., 2016. Web. 17 Apr. 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Lischer, Page 97

¹⁰⁸ Abarbanell, Stephan

¹⁰⁹ Human Right Committee. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." United Nations, 03 Dec. 2015. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Piazza, James A. "Draining the swamp: Democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30.6 (2007): 521-539. Page 525

in Iraq, their final resolution for Iraqi government is not as effective, without assistance of the international community.

On the other hand, IDP dilemma is worst in Syria. Restricting IDPs freedom of movement is a violation under Principle 14 and 15 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.¹¹⁴ In Syria, the basic human rights of IDPs including their freedom of movement and security are being constantly violated by the Syrian government. On April 2017, the Syrian government used a chemical weapon-banned by the international law- to attack civilians, which was announced as the deadliest attack on Syrian people.¹¹⁵ The UN Security Council called for an emergency meeting of member states in Brussel to come up with a resolution, however donor states fear that Russia, as Syrian government's ally will veto the resolution as "unacceptable".¹¹⁶ However, in response to the chemical attack, after two days, the U.S government immediately launched missile attacks on the Syrian defense warehouse, destroying fighter jets and military materials.¹¹⁷ There are different debates regarding the immediate response of the U.S president, without the Congress and the U.N's authorization, which many believe that it violated the international law.¹¹⁸ Although Syria is a failed state, but it is still recognized as a nation-state with the right to their sovereignty.¹¹⁹ At the same time, the U.S military strike toward the Syrian airfield is considered as an effective force by many, such as the U.S Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, The British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, President Francois Hollande of France, President Erdogan of Turkey, Saudi officials and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel.¹²⁰ However, Russia, Iran and Syria compared the attack as a dangerous violation of international law and similar to other U.S invasions for regime change in the Middle East, such as Iraq without the U.N Security Council permission.¹²¹

vi. Right to Intervene Versus Responsibility to Protect

Now the question is what are the effective enforcements by the international community to protect lives of IDPs in failed states, such as Iraq and Syria? International community can be best structured if states respect each other's sovereignty in their internal affairs.¹²² Humanitarian intervention was implemented to protect the rights of people in cases where the

¹¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) - Norwegian Refugee Council. "IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State." *IDMC » Syria: Forsaken IDPs Adrift inside a Fragmenting State*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014.

¹¹⁵In 2012, The Syrian government was banned by the UN Security Council to use chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S and Europe believe that the chemical attack was done by Assad's government, although Russia, Syria and Iran claim that there is no proof and ISIS is responsible for the chemical attack. Sengupta, Somini, and Rick Gladstone. "Nikki Haley Says U.S. May 'Take Our Own Action' on Syrian Chemical Attack." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 05 Apr. 2017. Web. 06 Apr. 2017

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ The U.S administration ordered for the missile attack on Syria's airbase and as Trump stated, Assad has crossed the "red line" and therefore U.S has ordered for their first direct military attack against Assad's regime. Macfarquhar, Neil. "Russia Suspends Cooperation with U.S. In Syria After Missile Strikes." *The New York Times*, 07 Apr. 2017

¹¹⁸ argued by Sen. Rand Paul, Russian President Vladimir Putin provided in the article: Diamond, Barbara Starr and Jeremy. "Trump Launches Military Strike against Syria." CNN. Cable News Network, 06 Apr. 2017. Web. 07 Apr. 2017. Also supported by Iran's officials such as Bahram Ghasemi (a spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry), Mr. Peskov (a spokesman for Putin) in MacFarquhar article.

¹¹⁹ argued by two different articles written by : Takeyh and Gvosdev Page 100 ; Piazza Page 525

¹²⁰ MacFARGUHAR, 2017

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ayoob, Mohammed. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty." 15.56 (2007): n. pag. 02 Feb. 2007. Page 81

state is incapable or unwilling to protect its citizens.¹²³ But at the same time, it challenges state sovereignty regarding internal affairs. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, declared that state sovereignty is not absolute and it can be overruled in specific circumstances.¹²⁴ But the controversial debate was and still is at what point external forces have the right to take coercive actions to protect citizens of another state.¹²⁵

5. LACK OF EFFECTIVE ACTION

International community includes different states, as well as international organizations such as NATO.¹²⁶ In reality, influential state's interest with high military power plays an important part in whether humanitarian issues in another country becomes a concern, which can also effect the UN Security Council's decisions.¹²⁷ There have been many controversial debates about the interventions in Somalia 1993, Rwanda 1994 and Bosnia in 1994, which "UN actions taken (if taken at all) were widely perceived as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, poorly executed".¹²⁸ The UN Security Council intervention has failed to address humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Kosovo, as well as failure to take effective action to stop the murdering of 800,000 people in the Great Lakes region of Africa, 1994.¹²⁹ The lack of reaction to the Rwanda crisis on one side and reacting too early in Kosovo 1994 by 78 days bombing authorized by UN Security Council and NATO support on the other side, created more human suffering, rather than protection.¹³⁰

6. STATES' INTERESTS

Besides the lack of effective actions by the UN, recognizing the interests and intentions of member states under the international community to interfere in another state's internal affairs are also significant. One example is post 9/11 and the after-effect of the U.S coercive military intervention to change the regime of Iraq for humanitarian purposes.¹³¹ The U.S intervention in Iraq led many states and scholars to question the legitimacy of military interventions for humanitarian purposes and abusing another state's sovereignty.¹³² Also, many argue that if the U.S intervention in Afghanistan were more about protecting people rather than only removing Taliban, it could have been harder for Al-Qaeda to expand there.¹³³ When a state such as the U.S intervenes for the purpose of protecting people and removing Taliban's power in Afghanistan, they were also responsible to rebuild the country or it would have become a safe haven for terrorist groups, which is the current case in Afghanistan.¹³⁴

Therefore, it is important to look at legal, political, moral and operational ways of the international community in handling the notion of state sovereignty and dealing with the

¹²³ Ayoob, Mohammed. Page 82

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Evans, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa: ICISS., n.d. International Development Research Centre, Dec. 2001. Web.

¹²⁶ "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Responsibility to Protect Report." *Council on Foreign Relations* (December 2001)

¹²⁷ Ayoob, Page 89

¹²⁸ Evan, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun

¹²⁹ Weiss, Thomas G. "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era." *Security dialogue* 35.2 (2004): 135-153. Page 141

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Macfarlane, S. Neil, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss. "The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" *Third World Quarterly* 25.5 (2004): 977-992. Page 977

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Weiss, Page 143

¹³⁴ Ibid.

internal conflicts within one state including the protection of IDPs and whether it is specific state's economic or strategic interest to intervene in another state or it is purely based on humanitarian reasons.¹³⁵ Currently, Assad's government keeps targeting civilians within Syria and use banned chemical weapons on them. On one side, the U.S airstrike in response to Assad's regime has been criticized (for going against another country's regime and undermining the international law). On the other hand, the role of Russia for supporting Assad's government is also being blamed, since Syria as a sovereign nation is abusing its people. Now the dilemma that exists is that both the U.S and Russia are members of the Security Council. Any effective decisions against the Assad's government will get vetoed by Russia, as it did in 2012, after Assad chemically attacked civilians. However, the U.S will impose new alternatives to topple Assad's government and support its allies' interests such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel who are against Assad's government. Both Russia and the U.S interests and their political interests are playing parts and intervening the diplomatic negotiations on the issue of Syria. As this circle goes on, there will be unlikely any effective solution anytime soon.

7. INTERVENTION OR PROTECTION

In terms of the responsibility of the international community, Gareth Evan and Mohamed Sahnoun, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argue that the phrase "right to intervene" should change into "responsibility to protect".¹³⁶ The reason behind changing 'intervention' to 'protection' is that it provides three advantages, which includes focusing on the issue of protecting those in need (women, children, ethnic minorities), implying the responsibility of other states to protect and enforcing three dimensions, such as "responsibility to react", "responsibility to prevent" and "responsibility to rebuild".¹³⁷

ICISS presented by the Canadian government in 2000 is an example of a new approach for the international community to follow, which frames the policy actions regarding the issue of intervention and sovereignty.¹³⁸ It argues that the UN Security Council has the "right authority" to act as a decision maker.¹³⁹ According to the report, military intervention applies in cases where there is a "large scale loss of life" and "large scale 'ethnic cleansing'".¹⁴⁰ However, in reality the circumstances are different. For example, although there was no evidence of massive human suffering in Iraq during 2003, the only justification for the U.S intervention in Iraq was toward "human protection", after they failed in finding any weapon of mass destruction.¹⁴¹ Moreover, the Iraq war lacked both the international support and UN

¹³⁵ "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Responsibility to Protect Report." *Council on Foreign Relations* (December 2001)

¹³⁶ Evans, Sahnoun.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Each term is defined under the same article. "the responsibility to prevent" addresses both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. "The responsibility to react" means to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. "The responsibility to rebuild" refers to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert

¹³⁸ Macfarlane, S. Neil, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss. Page 978

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Evans, Sahnoun.

¹⁴¹ Macfarlane, S. Neil, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss. Page 984

Security Council as the “right authority”, also later under 2004 annual report of Human Rights Watch, it criticized the initial intention of U.S forces as “not a humanitarian intervention”.¹⁴²

Overall, there have been many criticisms toward the ICISS report and the Responsibility to Protect, such as viewing them as a “liberal internationalist framework”, which does not take into consideration the failed military intervention in Iraq and diverse perspectives of human security in Muslim countries.¹⁴³ Although R2P was not implemented during the 2003 Iraq war, but there are not effective guidelines to prevent another failed intervention in the future. Western, Latin American and some Sub-Saharan African countries favor the guideline, unlike China, Russia and other East Asian countries, whom rejected the idea of humanitarian, military intervention and are strict toward the idea of sovereignty in their internal affairs.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, there is a concern by other states regarding powerful states’ intervention based on wrong intentions; for example, the U.S preventive war in another state and labeling it as humanitarian intervention.¹⁴⁵ Although there are other influential member states under the UN, Washington’s spending on its military makes it harder for the UN to control the U.S actions.¹⁴⁶ UN resolutions during the war in Iraq were debated as a “referendum not on the means of disarming Iraq but on the American use of power”.¹⁴⁷ Some argue that coercive operation by the UN usually needs the approval of Washington as the relationship between the UN and U.S military power is inseparable.¹⁴⁸

8. CONCLUSION

Although international law does not protect IDPs, there are basic human rights that apply to every human being around the globe. On the positive side, IDPs are universally identified under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Moreover, International Committees have recognized many violations taken place toward IDPs in Iraq and Syria and provide alternatives regarding those problems. Unfortunately, those alternatives are not as effective, since Syria’s government constantly violates basic human rights of its citizens and Iraq as a failed state is incapable of enforcing effective protections for IDPs. The sectarian conflicts and terrorist organizations exists in both Syria and Iraq, which further escalades the IDP dilemma. With abusive governments on one hand, terrorist activities and external forces’ military interventions against terrorism on the other, this paper has recommended few alternatives, such as the involvement of more humanitarian assistance with donations from more governments and private entities, cooperation between states regarding refugee crisis and a well-structured intervention by international community to protect IDPs in failed states.

However, by looking at the role of ICISS, R2P and the failure of the UN, the UN Security Council, different strategic interests of the dominant member states of the UN Security Council, all provide concerns toward effectiveness of any kinds of intervention (whether humanitarian, diplomatic or military intervention). This paper recognizes the strategic geopolitical values of both Iraq and Syria for various countries, such as Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kurdish tribes, the U.S, as well as transnational terrorist organizations

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid. Page 982

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Weiss, Page 137

¹⁴⁶ Weiss, Page 140

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Foot, Rosemary; S. Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno, Eds, 2003. *The United States and Multilateral Organizations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weiss 141, Byers, Michael & George Nolte, eds, 2003. *United States Hegemony and the Foundation of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

including the ISIS and Al-Qaeda. All these different parties involved in a failed state, such as Syria lessens the chance of coming to any solutions regarding creating political stability or any kinds of universal plan that does not undermine any of these involved countries' interests. For the time being, G20 countries, which are financially and economically advanced need to donate more capitals to Iraq and Syria's neighboring countries, including Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Greece, which are holding more refugees than their capabilities. The greater purpose of these funds is to decrease the chances of any of these weak states to be in danger of turning to another Syria. The UN should also impose the same pressure on member states to donate capitals and at least accept 10% of the most vulnerable population from Iraq and Syria. As it goes for the IDPs in Syria, at this point in which civilians are being targeted both by the government and terrorist organizations, the only pragmatic solution is for the UN to militarily intervene in Syria. The military intervention in Syria would also decrease the tensions in Iraq from supporting their borders from ISIS. However, the military intervention needs to be completely analyzed beforehand to succeed, in order to avoid another Libya and leave the country in a worse condition than before. After the military intervention of the UN, donated capitals by G20 countries come into play toward rebuilding Syria and assist Iraq toward creating stability. But many questions still remain. At what point Russia and China will accept the military intervention in Syria and how hard Iran and Russia are willing to fight to support Assad's government?

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