

**AN ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA INFLUENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON TANZANIA  
PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCES OPERATIONS DURING THE KAGERA WAR  
FROM 1978 TO JUNE 1979**

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**Abstract:** *This study assesses media influence and its effects on the operations of Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) during the war between Tanzania and Uganda which broke out in 1978 following the latter's claim of the Kagera enclave – a piece of land within Tanzania. This study on the Kagera war as the war came to be commonly known – has employed both qualitative and quantitative methods to accomplish the fundamental goal of investigating and assessing the influence of media during the war. The sparks of the Kagera war can be traced back to 1966 when the internal conflict started in Uganda in the wake of a constitutional amendment that removed Buganda's King and first President of Uganda after independence, Kabaka Edward Mutesa, and declared the country a Republic under the second President Dr. Milton Obote. In 1971 President Obote was replaced through a coup by his Army Commander, General Idi Amin, who constantly appeared to seek ways of diverting the attention of his citizens from domestic conflicts to international adventures. The objective of this study is not to narrate the annexation and occupation of the Kagera enclave in Tanzania by President Amin in 1978. Neither is it a study that explores the causes of the Kagera war itself. It is rather an assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations from October 1978 to June 1979. I submit that it is indeed intriguing that despite its significance for scholars – especially political scientists, historians or economists – the Kagera war has not elicited curiosity among academicians particularly those in Tanzania. As a result, the literature on the Kagera war is both scanty and limited. Furthermore, little has been done by whoever should have, to document the various aspects of the Kagera war.*

**Keywords:** Media Influence, Military, Politics, Conflict, war

**Research Area:** Social Science

**Paper Type:** Conceptual Paper

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## **1. BACKGROUND**

The Kagera War is a historical event that took place from October 1978 to June 1979 between Tanzania and Uganda. The role played by the media in providing significant coverage during the war has not received sufficient academic attention. The study, therefore, assessed media influence and its effects on Tanzania Peoples' Defence Forces (TPDF) operations during the Kagera War.

The Kagera war can be traced way back to 1966 when it started as a homegrown conflict in Uganda, in the wake of a constitutional amendment that removed Uganda's traditional leader Kabaka Edward Mutesa. At that time the President of Uganda declared the country to be a Republic under Dr. Milton Obote as reported in local newspapers (Sauti ya Mwafrika, 'Obote aweka Mawaziri Ndani' Page 1, 25 February 1966), (Sauti ya Mwafrika, 'Obote Achukua Madaraka yote hata ya Rais', Page 1, 4, March 1966) and (Sunday Nation, 'Mutesa Move Outside Constitution', page, 6 March 1966).

Tension within Uganda developed especially with the controversial abolition of Buganda, Ankole and Toro Kingdoms. Gershenberg (1972) describes that in addition to sour

political situation in Uganda, at the beginning of September 1969, President Obote began to define a strategy which would move Uganda to the left popularly known as the Common Man's Charter as reported in *The People*, 'Why we are moving left' 22, September, 1969. This was considered undesirable to some individuals in the government and the west. Also, another presumed technical mistake for President Obote was that he unknowingly groomed his friend who will later turn enemy to a high rank of Major General and Chief of Armed Forces of Uganda. He was none other than Idi Amin Dada. Shortly afterwards, General Idi Amin discovered that Obote intended to arrest him on charges of misappropriating millions of dollars of military funds. As a move to avoid his arrest, Gen Amin staged the coup on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1971 while Milton Obote was out of the country attending the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. Amin staged a coup that was later reported to have been backed by Israel and welcomed by the British and the United States of America, Kyemba (1977) and Karugire (2003).

The seizure of power in Uganda by General Amin through a military coup interrupted Obote's involvement in the Mulungushi Club (that was fighting for the freedom of southern Africa from colonial rule). The Club of which president Nyerere of Tanzania was part condemned the coup and vowed to restore Obote to power as reported in a series of media news items (*The People*, "Nyerere trying to select leaders for Uganda", 3 February 1971, page 3). By this time, Amin tried hard to consolidate power within and outside the country by assuring citizens that Uganda was at the second republic after the first republic following the constitutional amendment of 1966. President Amin it is believed, instead of uniting his people, was found dividing them by an iron fist rule.

The outbreak of the Kagera war at the end of October 1978 was not much anticipated by Tanzanians. The possibility of war had been taken for granted by many citizens. However, since General Amin came to power in Uganda on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1971, he had used media forcefully to express his resentment to Tanzania, claiming that Obote's supporters were undergoing training in Tanzania to overthrow his regime.

### **1.1 The Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for this study is a collaboration theory as opposed to individualism theory. The basis for this theory is that in peacetime it should encourage the military and media to find a slot to train together for basic security measures in a war situation. It is impossible to discuss an assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operation during the Kagera war without a guiding theory that would help to build an argument. For this reason, it cannot conclude why there is distrust and suspicious between media and military in a war situation unless we make interpretations by using shared knowledge and theory to get facts. This study had therefore employed collaboration point of view as its theoretical framework mainly because it views the need to bring about a teamwork spirit among media, military, government and citizens during war efforts. Journalists are driven by a desire to 'report the truth and nothing but the truth' to a news-hungry public. Caruthers (2011) observes that war not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it. Very often media fail to consider the consequence of their reports about war tactics; they may mistake a tactical retreat or withdrawing for a defeat and blow it out leading to unfavorable effects on the war front. All is left to army commanders to pick out the pieces and mend fences to restore confidence.

## **2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

This chapter provides a set-up of the research design and methodology. It starts by presenting the general area of field study, targeted people and kinds of sample used throughout this study. The chapter explores the research design and approach, data collection techniques, data analysis, issues of reliability and validity and finally the ethical consideration. Each of these elements is discussed in relation to the purpose and objectives presented in chapter one and the literature gaps discussed in the previous chapter.

### **2.1 Location of the Study**

The Kagera war was fought in West Lake Region and inside Uganda. Currently there are only heroes Arcs at Kaboya Barracks. Therefore, there was no significant attraction to conduct the studies in that general area. Instead the study location was mainly in the TPDF main library at Tanzania Military Academy (Monduli) and National Defence College located in Dar es Saalam. The national archive, the national library and the University of Dar es Salaam library were visited during data collection.

### **2.2 Study Design**

The study design is exploratory case study. Scholars such as Kothari (2004) and Creswell (1994) have made it easy for new scholars to use their works in order to figure out what consists of research design and also presented the way it should be accepted. Kothari (2004) makes clear the research design as a conceptual structure within which research is conducted. The key areas when conducting research normally includes data collection, measurement of data and most importantly the critical stage of analysis of data collected. Creswell (1994) provides the basis and need for deciding whether to use a qualitative or quantitative approach for the design of a research study, which gives the purpose of conducting this assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operation during the Kagera war. The image of the media and military relationship is dominated by distrust and suspicions, while the media and the military need for some reasons to depend on one another in order to accomplish essential task.

### **2.3 Population, Sample Size and Sampling Procedure**

The target population of this study was mainly war veterans, civilians, musicians and some journalists who participated in the Kagera war. The national war efforts during the Kagera war included everyone in Tanzania; therefore, there are some civilians' who had information to share in this study during fieldwork to assess the media influence on the Kagera war. The TPDF is only one part of four instruments of national power; diplomacy, intelligence, military and economy. The targeted population was limited to military personnel and civilians who participated in the Kagera war.

### **2.4 Selection of Sample Size**

The selection of sample for the study was purposive and based on the military personnel who attained the rank of General within TPDF chain of command, and those civilians who participated in the war. In all a sample size of twenty-five (25) was purposively selected for the study. This included fifteen (15) Military General and ten (10) civilians who participated in the war and are still alive. The soldiers comprised of those who fought or participated in one way or another in the Kagera war. The participants were considered to be eligible to respond to both unstructured questionnaires and in-deth interview guide questions on one to one basis.

## **2.5 Sampling Procedure**

The sampling technique was purposive, and the selection of participants for this study was categorized into three groups, who were carefully picked based on their ranks, position held as well as role played during the Kagera war as follows: (1) The first group included some military personnel who were employed at a strategic level. This group included Generals who participated in the Kagera war. At the strategic level is where a decision was made to use national resources to achieve national objectives. The directives are issued to the designated commander to use military power in order to achieve military strategic end state. (2) The second category involved military personnel employed at operational level. This group included those military commanders who conducted the Kagera war as commanders and staff officers to achieve military strategic end state. They were very familiar with the general situation of conducting the Kagera war and the role played by media campaign. (3)

The third class was drawn from those military personnel deployed at tactical level and including civilians with knowledge of the Kagera war. In its totality, categorization pivoted the studies, which resulted in exactly the amount of information required during the field studies. The selection of samples and the nature of the study required extra careful efforts to avoid misunderstanding and unnecessary controversial issues of the Nation Security Act and the familiarity of individuals with the Kagera war.

## **2.6 Sources and Types of Data**

The places for secondary data reachable differed in location and distance impacting on materials available for the study. They further differed in ideology and general perception. During the Kagera war Kenya was in favour of President Amin and did not believe at any moment that he would fall as reported earlier by Lengo of 15 October 1972 with the heading Amin: Jana na Leo, and Lengo of 1 November, 1972 with the heading Jirani Mwema. (1) Tanzania National library (2) Tanzania National Archive (3) The TPDF museum (4) TBC libraries (5) Films captured in the Kagera war (6) The focus on external fieldwork was directed to Uganda National Library and archive. (7) Kenya National library and its respective National archive was visited for the purpose of cross-checking media coverage as stated in the introduction of the problem.

## **2.7 Data Collection Techniques**

The test of why media-military relationship is not stable especially when there is outbreak of war. There is no single military officer who can deny the notion of the media being at the middle of distortion, suspicion and distrust in the dissemination of information to the public. When interviewees were asked on the role played by the media during the mobilization and the eviction of Amin's troops from Tanzanian territory, they were proud of the high secrecy imposed at each stage until the need arose or it was the right time for the public to be informed and prepared psychologically to get in on the real progress of the war.

## **2.8 Unstructured Questionnaire**

The study administered unstructured questions to gather responses about the media-military relationship during the Kagera war. The structured questionnaire was not used in the data collection because many of participants are in the advanced age and they normally prefer unstructured interviews, which also gave them time to narrate the Kagera war as most of them could still recount very well various events in the war.

## **2.9 Documentary Review**

As stated in the 'statement of the problem' of this study, the Kagera war had not received much academic attention. Most academicians in Tanzania did not focus on how to document the Kagera war. The main reasons have been discussed above, is the difficulties for academicians to access data from the military custodian. The efforts by TPDF Museum and TBC libraries have managed to retain at least enough content including documentaries which aided in field interviews and data collection.

## **2.10 Focus Group Discussion**

This study also employed focus group discussion as one of the techniques for the data collection. The control of discussion was not organized by the researcher but was obtained from a syllabus on military training at Tanzania Military Academy (TMA) where war campaign is one of the necessary subjects in various courses. The class is normally divided into syndicates, while other syndicates prepare to challenge the group presenting their findings. The constraints of the Kagera war are the lack of sufficient literature, which discourages many student officers from opting to discuss the Kagera war as they cannot widen their argument. Techniques of Data Analysis. For this study, the data from both primary and secondary sources were in the form of qualitative information. It was in the form of words, patterns, and statements from the participants. The analysis, therefore, involves making comprehensive and analytical descriptions statements made by the participants in the form of explanations and drawing inferences. Reliability and Validity. Thus, in assessing media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war, different sources of information were used. The evidence from the sources was then evaluated to build justification. For example, the sources were asked how they know that the Kagera salient was invaded by Amin'stroops? Most of the participants confirmed that they knew of the war through the radio. Therefore, the important instrument here is the media that can link the military and the citizens.

## **2.11 Ethical Considerations**

The nature of this study was a bit tough for most of the Participants because they were still under the 'Nation security Act of 30 March 1970' which guides them throughout their lifetime even if most of them are retired as civil servants. There was a general feeling of withholding information because of controversial issues and limitation of the said Act. Before conducting the interviews, the researcher had to clarify in detail the permission from Army Headquarters to conduct such data collection. A concise self-introduction and quickly building rapport were another technique used to build confidence among interviewees, especially on the confidentiality aspect.

## **3. FINDINGS**

### **3.1 Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussions**

This chapter analyses and discusses the data that explaining the media influence and its effects on Tanzania peoples defence forces operations during the Kagera war from 1978 to June 1979. The assessment of media influence during this war is to contribute to the findings and proposing tangible methods that can be used by both the media and the military in a war situation. The Kagera war is one of the conflicts that set a good example of where the media campaign and military operations were carried out without affecting each other negatively.



### **3.2 The Role of Media in the Kagera War**

This section presents the results of analysis of the role played by the media in providing coverage on the Kagera war from October 1978 to June 1979. The first objective was to evaluate the role played by the media campaign in providing coverage of the Kagera war from October 1978 to June 1979. The findings suggest that there was a serious scarcity of information for the media campaign. Though media personnel were patriotic, they worked in a difficult environment to fulfill the interest of the nation. The restriction imposed by the government and military officials affected the media campaign reaching the public in good time. However, these findings suggest that the media contributed credible information and records of war making it possible for Ugandans to write many books compared to Tanzania. The lack of stable official government in post-conflict Uganda also gave room for academicians in Uganda to write about the conflict by using the media as the main source of their information without restrictions. Moreover, the findings suggest that official announcement and declaration of war by President Nyerere was done on 2 November 1978. The historical speech of war was used in this study to give overviews of the role of the media campaign performance in the Kagera war. The participants indicate that “only town dwellers especially in Dar es Salaam were often able to access newspapers on a daily basis.” A similar problem of accessing stories of the Kagera war in newspapers was experienced by the majority who were based outside the capital Dar es Salaam. They however depended on RTD for updates on war progress, which was not often broadcasted in the mainstream media. The study results revealed that it was not easy for some Participants to access newspapers and radio in the era of the Kagera War. Some refer to the fact that they used to read newspapers three to five days after newspapers have been published. Though the media was censored, the results revealed it however played a major role by keeping in touch with the public about the progress of the Kagera war despite the hard conditions imposed over media operations. The most effective were through RTD especially on: (1) Commentary after the news (2) Various talk shows (3) Greetings (4) Music programme and cartoons.

### **3.3 The Cartoons in Newspapers**

Other areas which performed very well during the Kagera war were cartoons arts. Darnton (2000) depicts it in earliest evidence of media news circulated through several media and by different modes oral, manuscript and prints, which also considered the political constraints. According to Lusekelo (2016) argues that the study of political cartoons provides the best link between linguistic signs, artistic pictures, and cognitive power of the artists and audiences in interpreting the contents of the cartoons produced for the depiction of political issues in sub-Saharan Africa. It is true that during the Kagera war journalists in Tanzania used cartoons as a means of sending direct war message and well perceived by citizens. During the Kagera war, cartoons appeared in print media and had substantial significance to carry considerable intended message socially, politically and militarily. Newspapers portrayed Amin as a destructive person with the face of a snake and ruthless soldier. The Daily Newspaper cartoon on 17 November 1978 and display Amin uncountable medal while Uhuru Newspaper display Amin's head pieced. All newspapers adopted means of using big cartoons portraying Amin's carnage and behaviour without caption or stories related with that cartoon and posted on front pages. The political cartoons rotate around the manipulations of language by the cartoonists to arrive at a targeted purpose. Studies of stylistic devices affirm that numerous techniques are employed to exhibit a point in literary works Lusekelo (2016).



For instance: On Uhuru, 12 December 1978



The Daily Newspaper cartoon on 17 November 1978 and display Amin with a lot of military medals



Uhuru, 13 December 1978 displaying Amin's head pierced properly

### **3.4 Phases of the Kagera War and Media Response to these changes**

The second objective of this study was to elucidate the phases of Kagera war. The findings suggest that in conducting the Kagera war the language became the most lethal weapon to evict invading forces and eventually overthrown Amin's regime in Uganda. The nation war effort was guided by the media campaign. Strategically the Kagera war media campaigns were embedded into three successful phases of the war as mentioned by the participants during the interview for the purpose of this study. The phases as enumerated as follows: (a) Phase one was to evict Amin's troops from Tanzania territory (b) Phase two was the punishment of enemy forces inside Uganda (c) Phase three was the liberation war, which ended Amin's regime in Kampala.

All these remarkable achievements in the Kagera war were the outcome of positive effects of the media campaign. One of the participants mentioned that: The main reason for identifying the phases of the war was to manage participants interviewed in order to investigate their competent knowledge of media campaign coverage throughout the Kagera war. The results of the testing of the media influence within these three phases of the war were to help investigate the knowledge of Participants in their general awareness of how media successfully influenced the Kagera war.

### **3.5 The Impact of Media Coverage of the Kagera War**

#### *3.5.1 Category of Media Coverage of the War*

The section presents the results of analyses and discussions of the impact of media coverage of the progress of the Kagera war on both the military and general public. The assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war came out with new insights on the Tanzania and Uganda war. The findings suggest the kinds of media used during the Kagera war were so peculiar. The review of literature revealed that media was considered to be working in several categories such as: - (a) Cultural performances which carried messages of war and decision made to evict enemy forces; (b)

Composed music, poems and songs; (c) Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam; (d) Newspapers of all types.

Also, findings suggest that choirs, musicians and dancers were used to compose their war messages as an enactment of the speeches from the Mwalimu Nyerere and other leaders. The decision made to use cultural performance was spectacular and extraordinarily effective all over the country. This method did not oppose Amin's propaganda but got in touch with Tanzania citizens and communicated what they were supposed to do against Amin's troops. Media in the form of radio and newspapers remained un-reactive to Amin's propaganda because the government official did not want to help spreading Amin's propaganda against Tanzania.

### *3.5.2 Impact of Media Coverage on both Military and Public*

The findings show that media impact was greater than it was expected through the government officials-imposed restrictions on media during the Kagera war. The participants reported that: "Except for state media especially RTD programmes, local newspapers and military journalists' took stage on film works. Others were individual journalists selected and embedded in TPDF to record remarkable achievements during phase three inside Uganda." This finding suggests that the late embedded media was held after Tanzania became confident of successfully getting rid of Amin on ground.

### *3.5.3 Militia Mobilization*

Analysis shows that media campaign played a very successful role in militia mobilization all over the country. By that time communication networks were very poor be it radio, newspapers and road networks but media appeared in various forms and played a significant role.

### *3.5.4 Citizens Mobilization*

Also, one other major media campaign ever conducted in Tanzania was the nation war efforts during the Kagera war. This means that citizens were engaged with the national interest through media. Despite poor network for communication, still political leaders and military commanders were connected to the citizens. The citizens offered their belongings to support the military actions against invading troops. The following were experiences as reported by the participants:

### *3.5.5 TPDF Mobilization*

Further, the results of interviews conducted indicate that the Kagera inversion was a new phenomenon that abruptly plunged the nation into war against a neighbouring state. According one of the participants, a retired General with the TPDF said: "the TPGF has to undergo rapid changes in order to suit needs aroused" (Participant, interviewed on 12/6/2017). He further said the media played important roles in these changes in TPDF.

### *3.5.6 Nation Defence Mobilization*

The findings as suggested by the participants during the interview revealed that the nation was at war, and that the media campaign was necessary to unite citizens. This means that nation defence mobilization was taken to grassroots through media campaign. One participant thus reported that: 'The citizens were urged to be brilliant and suspicious of everyone in their areas, and the leaders of tenth cells became more important because they were the protectors of their own people residences (Participant, interviewed on 12/6/2017).



### *3.5.7 The Security challenges and Strategies adopted*

The findings of this study suggest that the Kagera war was divided into three phases. These phases adopted security measures in each phase. The media campaign was organized to suit each phase. This means that the strategies and objectives adopted in each phases of war emphasized defending territorial integrity in general even as media campaign capitalized on core objectives of each phase.

### *3.5.8 The news censorship and response to enemy propaganda*

The findings also suggest that President Amin of Uganda used excessive media propaganda against Tanzania. President Amin's propaganda lacked objectivity and truthfulness. The participants' suggested that: "Whenever news came from Uganda some media had problems to confirm and balance the story before broadcasting the news. At the same time in Uganda, the President himself controlled the media and the media did not have choice but to broadcast every single word spoken by Amin" (Participant interviewed on 15/6/2017). The findings indicate that journalists after realizing that whatever was broadcasted by radio Uganda was directed by Amin, decided to quote every statement from the radio without verification. As a result: "The enemy propaganda escalated news crisis during the Kagera war because most of journalists decided to locate themselves in Kenya. By the time they had news from Uganda and confirmed by radio Uganda as main source of news most of them wanted to confirm the integrity and to determine if it was the true version of the news and story by comparing with news from Tanzania" (Participant interviewed on 15/6/2017).

The consecution from results of the analysis is that President Amin was obliged to announce the presence of his troops in Kagera salient to legalise annexation. The findings suggest that Amin at the beginning did not say what was true by buying time and Mwalimu Nyerere was tired of him. When Amin declared that his troops were inside Tanzania, now Mwalimu Nyerere had a convincing ground to declare war. That is the announcement by Amin that his troops were in Kagera salient. This was the beginning of the fall of Amin.

### *3.5.9 Proposed Model of Media-Military Collaboration*

Based on the findings of this study as explained above, a model has been proposed which media and military can use to avoid tedious working relationships. This means that without overstating data collected, sustainable collaboration is the proposed model that can bring together media and military because all are working on behalf of taxpayers who are constitutional rights to be informed. Therefore, there is a need for the arrangement of counteraction of media and military relationships. This is because; the findings suggest that during data collection, outcomes were unlike the stereotype of labelling media as whistleblowers. This means that it is necessary for remedial measures to be taken in order to complement the existing working relationship between media and military. Thus, based on findings, following are considered to be credible working relationships between media and military:- (a) Both media and military should understand their basic roles that bring them together during war situation (b) Military should speed up censorship in order to meet timeline of media after being satisfied with amount of news and information to be released to the public (c) Both media and military should understand that they are working on behalf of taxpayers who sponsor war and that they have rights to know and judge through consequences of actions (d) Military should understand that media is a multiplier force that can be used to force parties in order to avoid destructive war by bringing together all parties

in conflict (e) Both should address their distrust and suspicious in order to have one solid solution that can harmonize them and diffuse tension.

#### *3.5.10 Summary and Conclusion of Chapter Four*

The chapter presents the findings and discussions of the data for the study. This study indicated that most of the participants considered media campaign during the Kagera war as positive and gave a relative advantage in each stage of the war. The study of an assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations revealed that strategies used to affect nation war efforts were good and reliable.

### **4. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The first section of this chapter presents a summary of the assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war. The second section gives the proposed conclusions based on the study findings obtain from data collection in the field work. The third section presents the contribution to knowledge. The last section of this study gives recommendations and suggestions for academicians to take on for further study of the role of media influence during the Kagera war. This is the standing war the country fought using national, economic as well as local resources to combat invading forces successfully but in the process clipped the national economy for some years.

#### **4.1 Summary of Key Findings**

This study focused on the assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operation during the Kagera war. The main focus was to investigate specifically media influence during the Kagera war. Moreover, the study sought to broaden working relationships between media and military in war situations. For years media and military have been working together in war situations especially in developed countries but still, this relationship is dominated by distrust and suspicious.

During data collection, this study recorded a very successful media campaign throughout the three significance phases of the Kagera war. In order to accomplish the objectives of this study of an assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations, both purposive and random sampling techniques were used during data gathering and analysis. Participants were randomly selected from Dar es Salaam area, Coastal area and up the country.

During data collection, the main source of data was the Kagera war veterans. They are able to recount very well the Kagera war. The questionnaires and interviews were conducted. These questionnaires and interviews provided a room to determine both the levels of knowledge of the media influence on the Kagera war, including the working relationship between media and military.

The supplementary data was collected from books, journals, unpublished TPDF documents and collection of various speeches of Mwalimu Nyerere from 1964 to 1999 available at TPDF library. Unstructured interviews were another method used for conducting interviews because most of the interviewees are in their advanced age. Moreover, the data collection used unguided focus group discussion in Tanzania Military Academy (Monduli) and one in Military Intelligence School. Data were then analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The major findings of this assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war are guided by the research questions and specific objectives: -

The first research objective sought to evaluate the role played by the media in providing coverage on the Kagera war from October 1978 to June 1979. Among the war veterans and civilians who participated in this study, no one has made efforts to write about the Kagera but they still have fresh memories of how media campaign was more effective during the Kagera war. Most of the Participants indicated that commentary after the news run by RTD was the most prominent communication held by media.

The second research objective aimed to identify the phases of the Kagera war and media response to these changes. The findings show that media shaped those three phases of the Kagera war and tuned language was used by media to demarcate one stage to from another. The findings indicate that the Kagera war was divided into three specific phases used effectively to guide TPDF operations: (a) Phase one dominated by eviction of invading forces from Kagera Salient (b) Phase two directed TPDF to extend operations inside Uganda as punishment for invasion and (c) Phase three focused on liberation as well as regime change in Kampala. The most significant machinery to accomplish those three phases of the Kagera war (above) was the successful media campaign which made it possible.

The third objective of this study was to assess the impact of media coverage of the progress of the Kagera war on both the military and general public. The study identified in details impact of media coverage during the Kagera war. From the findings of this study media impact detailed the following registered impacts on national war efforts: (a) Citizens were mobilized through media to support course of war (b) Citizens offered their belonging to support TPDF in frontline (c) Voluntarily citizens were mobilized to undergo militias training (d) Voluntarily all over the country youths were mobilized to join TPDF (e) School drop-out was experienced particularly in Mara region.

The fourth objective of this study sought to guess and test the possible distrust and suspicious, which results in tedious working relationships between media and military. The objective was to identify the main security challenges faced by military and strategies adopted in managing the dissemination of information which was considered appropriate for public consumption. The outcome was obvious that during the Kagera war, the security apparatus took part in order to control both the security of citizens and military personnel as reflected in the speech of Mwalimu Nyerere when declaring the war. The fifth objective aimed to assess news censorship and response to enemy propaganda and military relations with foreign media. The findings reveal that most contentious issues between media and military are the imposition of censorship on media during the outbreak of war. There is a general feeling that the military is always trying to overrule media. Instead of government and military officials establishing a system of briefing media in relations with the Kagera war, they adopted a new system of communicating with citizens using cultural performance, song, poems and militias training. All these were to be addressed in various Mwalimu Nyerere speeches, which provided guidance and directions to be followed by the nation. The war messages were effectively carried in those areas to supplement newspaper and radio for the same time.

## **4.2 Conclusion**

Based on these findings of the assessment of the Media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war, the following conclusions are made. Firstly, it can be concluded that the Kagera war was fought between Tanzania and Uganda in October 1978 to June 1979. The significance of this war is still debated, and academicians have not seen this potential of writing about the Kagera war to fill the gap of literature in this war.

Furthermore, very little is done at the National level taking intervention action to write the proper version of the Kagera war.

During the data collection, the expectation was high to get much documentation information stored in Tanzania National archive, but it was very disappointing because there is no information that can help to recount the Kagera war. Most of them have become story tellers and developed suspicions of security issues thus refuse supporting researchers when asked about the Kagera war records.

The greatest shortcomings identified in the Participants working were the conceptual and procedural position of the individual in connection with the Kagera war. The target Participants were the Kagera war veterans. Though now retired, some still feel that they are not allowed to talk about the Kagera war except by special permission from TPDF Headquarters, which discourage young researchers trying to explore this historical war. Perhaps these were due to poor mastery of concepts of recounting the Kagera war as a prestige for Tanzania and not someone trying to have a conflict with the Nation Security Act. Most interviewees seem to know much about the Kagera war but all have now become storytellers of the war.

#### **4.3 Recommendations**

During the data analysis which resulted in the findings from this present piece of study, it is recommended that: The media influence and its effects on TPDF during the Kagera war be written by Tanzanians to provide their version because this is the national prestige of fighting and winning a war. Ugandans have written much on the Kagera war, their version. Media and military planners should understand that they always are working on behalf of taxpayers who sponsor wars such as in the case of the Kagera war which led to a big victory. Media in the Kagera war was the multiplier force and a lethal weapon in all three phases of the Kagera war. The solidarity experienced in Tanzania during the Kagera war was created and carried out by media campaign throughout the country.

The corrective approach developed in this study is just an intervention measure taken academically and not a permanent solution to the problem that always persist between media and military in a war situation. The media is responsible together with the military and military should review its policies on working relationship with media in a war situation in order to achieve a common goal as happened in this war.

#### **4.4 Recommendations for Further Studies**

The current study is an exploratory case study of the working relationship between media and military. The assessment of media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war should be used as a stepping stone to reach a milestone of new insight on a precious working relationship, which finally brought victory to Tanzania against an aggressor. More efforts should be directed to narrow the study on cultural performance, songs and poems to be in a recorded format for the next generations as these played major roles in extending media to the grassroots. There is the need to use a quantitative approach to establish a significant relationship between media influence and its effects on TPDF operations during the Kagera war.

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